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When Sommers Are Winters: Do
Blanks Denote Revocability?
By Wendy C. Gerzog
In Sommers,1 the Tax Court had to decide whether
the decedent made completed gifts of limited liabil-
ity company interests to his three nieces on Decem-
ber 27, 2001, and January 4, 2002,2 or whether the
decedent retained control of the transferred prop-
erty so that under sections 2035(a)(2) and 2038, the
interests were includable in his estate.
The executrix argued for estate tax inclusion in
order to apportion the estate taxes to the decedent’s
nieces instead of effectively being taxed on those
gift interests herself.3 The government argued for a
higher value to the transferred partnership inter-
ests, which would have resulted in a larger gift tax
liability for the decedent’s estate,4 and in a reduc-
tion in the marital deduction and the executrix’s
share of the estate.
The decedent wanted to transfer artwork to his
nieces but did not want to incur any gift tax. In 2001
the maximum amount he could transfer under that
circumstance was $675,000; however, the art was
valued at $1.75 million. The decedent’s attorneys
suggested that the decedent and his nieces form an
LLC, which would own the artwork and restrict
transferability of its interests, and that the decedent
make gifts of LLC interests to his nieces over at least
two years.5 As advised, the nieces hired an ap-
praiser to value the LLC units.
The formation of the LLC, the decedent’s trans-
fers of the artwork to the LLC, and the nieces’ cash
purchase of the LLC interests beyond the de-
cedent’s 99 percent of the voting and 98 percent of
the nonvoting LLC units all occurred at the end of
December 2001.6 On December 27, three days after
the decedent and his nieces signed the LLC operat-
ing agreement, the decedent executed three gift
documents, each signed by one of his nieces, accept-
ing as donee. The documents purported to transfer
LLC units, but with the number of units intention-
ally omitted, awaiting the appraisal figures.
In the meantime, the law firm retained the in-
complete gift documents. At the end of March 2002,
the firm received the appraisal, which valued the
LLC at $1.76 million as of the two gift dates.
Calculating the maximum number of LLC units the
decedent could give his nieces free of transfer taxes,
the attorneys indicated that afterwards the de-
cedent would still retain 15.29 percent of the non-
voting interests. Unhappy with the prospect of
co-owning the artwork with the decedent’s second
1Sommers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-8. The court
ruled on both parties’ motions for partial summary judgment.
2The government and intervenors, decedent’s nieces, made
that argument.
3At the time of his death, decedent was married, but had no
children. The executrix was the sole heir and surviving spouse.
Without the applicability of the New Jersey equitable apportion-
ment statute, any additional 2001 gift taxes would diminish the
decedent’s estate and hence the executrix’s inheritance. See
Joseph M. Dodge et al., Federal Taxes on Gratuitous Transfers: Law
& Business 197-198 (2011); Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Equitable Appor-
tionment: Recent Cases and Continuing Trends,’’ 41 (ABA) Real
Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 671 (Winter 2007).
4Decedent died on November 1, 2002, within three years of
making his gifts, so the amount of gift tax paid on them must be
included in the estate under section 2935(b).
5That way, in 2001, decedent would transfer interests valued
at $675,000 plus three $10,000 annual exclusions, and in 2002 or
in a later year, he would transfer interests with the additional
2002 basic exclusion amount of $25,000 plus three additional
annual exclusions of $10,000.
6On December 21, 2001, the LLC was registered in Indiana.
On December 24 the decedent contributed his artwork in
exchange for capital units and, with his nieces, signed the LLC
operating agreement.
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In Sommers, equitable ap-
portionment altered the par-
ties’ conventional positions
when the court determined
whether blank spaces in the
decedent’s gift documents
prevented completion of his
gifts of limited liability com-
pany interests.
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ex-wife (who was soon to be remarried to the
decedent and who was expected to be the sole
beneficiary of the decedent’s estate), the nieces met
with the attorney. He suggested that they pay the
gift tax for the transfer of the decedent’s remaining
LLC interests, which would result in a net gift. They
agreed.7
On April 11, 2002, the attorney completed the
information in the gift documents — filling in the
number of transferred units and making other
modifications. He changed the clause containing
the blank number of units to a clause that provided
for ‘‘the decedent’s desire to transfer to each niece ‘a
number of Voting and Non-Voting capital units of
the . . . [LLC] that is equal to * * * ($233,417.00) as
determined by appraisal, provided that, the total
amount of such units shall be composed of * * * (1⁄3)
of Voting capital units owned by donor with the
remainder of such amount consisting of Non-voting
capital units of the Donor.’’8
Regarding the 2002 gift documents, besides indi-
cating the number of nonvoting units, the attorneys
made two additional changes: (1) omitting the
provision about effecting delivery of the gift by ‘‘a
duly executed transfer power representing the
units, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A,’’ and
substituting a statement about the donees’ agree-
ment to pay the gift taxes and any additional
applicable interest or penalties, including those
later assessed; and (2) omitting the original Exhibit
A. The attorneys then delivered all the gift docu-
ments to the decedent’s nieces.
In June 2002 the decedent claimed he had not
made a completed gift of the artwork to his nieces,
and that claim went to arbitration as required by the
LLC agreement. The decedent died on November 1,
2002, but in September 2005 the arbitrator ruled that
although the decedent may have switched his lar-
gesse to his second wife, the decedent knew that he
was making a gift to his nieces and that his inten-
tion was embodied in the 2001 and 2002 gift docu-
ments. According to the arbitrator, the decedent
irrevocably transferred the artwork to his LLC and
then gave all his LLC interests to his nieces. The
arbitrator’s award, plus attorney fees, was con-
firmed in 2007 by a final judgment from the Marion
Superior Court and affirmed in 2008 by the Indiana
appellate court.9
In 2007, claiming that the gifts were revocable
when made and thus includable in the decedent’s
estate when he relinquished his power within three
years of his death, the decedent’s executrix insti-
tuted an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
seeking to have the decedent’s nieces reimburse the
estate for their proportionate share of estate taxes
under the New Jersey apportionment statute. As an
alternative, seeking rescission and reformation, the
executrix maintained that because of the blanks left
in the gift documents, the gifts were made not in
2001 but in 2002 when the attorneys completed the
documents, indicating the nieces’ agreement to pay
all applicable gift and estate taxes and any penalties
and interest on their gifts.10
The New Jersey court held that the decedent
‘‘made a valid irrevocable transfer of the twelve
pieces of artwork to the LLC in December 2001; he
thereafter made valid, irrevocable gifts in December
2001 and January 2002 of all his capital shares of the
LLC to his nieces. The gift[s] were complete and
irrevocable by Dr. Sommers and, subsequently, ir-
revocable by the Estate of Dr. Sommers.’’ The court
then dismissed the executrix’s first claim without
prejudice as the apportionment issue was not ready
for a determination, but dismissed with prejudice
her remaining claims.11
The Tax Court first reviewed the standards for
the application of collateral estoppel and issue
preclusion. In Peck,12 it had enunciated five require-
ments for issue preclusion: The issue in the later
claim must be identical to the one in the earlier
claim; a court of competent jurisdiction must render
a final judgment; collateral estoppel is available
against the parties to the prior judgment; the issues
must have been litigated, resolved, and essential to
the earlier decision; and the critical facts and law
must be the same as those applicable in the earlier
7‘‘Mr. Kaltenmark opined that, as a net gift, the 2002 transfer
would reduce the 2002 gift tax obligation, and he estimated that
the tax on that gift would be $88,000 split three ways by the
nieces. The nieces decided to follow Mr. Kaltenmark’s sugges-
tion that they pay the 2002 gift tax.’’ T.C. Memo. 2013-8, at 13.
See Dodge et al., supra note 3, at 63-64.
8According to the court, the figure provided was one equal to
the then-applicable basic exclusion amount plus three annual
exclusions, although, as the court noted, that should have meant
three gifts of $235,000. T.C. Memo. 2013-8, at 14, n.6.
9See Sommers v. Sommers, 898 N.E.2d 1234 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008).
10Alternatively, the executrix sought a reformation that
would have produced the same results as her second argument.
She asserted a fourth position based on contract law and
promissory estoppel that required the nieces to pay all the
pertinent transfer taxes, a fifth argument based on mutual
mistake that results in rescission of the gifts, and a sixth claim
seeking reformation of the LLC units transferred so that the gifts
were limited to those transferrable tax free.
11In February 2009 the court entered that decision as its final
judgment. The following year, the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed.
12Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166-167 (1988), aff’d, 904
F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990).
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case.13 In its analysis, the court looked at whether
the Indiana and New Jersey courts would apply
issue preclusion under those circumstances.14
The Tax Court concluded that the Indiana arbi-
trator’s finding that the transfers were valid gifts
was a determination that they were irrevocable and
absolute, and consequently were both completed
gifts under the regulations,15 and not a retained
power under section 2038.16 The court held that that
finding thus satisfied the Peck requirements of issue
identity and application of the same legal prin-
ciples. Likewise, the court held that the New Jersey
litigation made the same conclusions. Also, the Tax
Court held that the findings that the 2001 and 2002
gifts were valid and complete gifts under both
Indiana and New Jersey law were essential to both
states’ determinations. It therefore held that the
executrix was collaterally estopped from contend-
ing otherwise in the instant litigation.
The Tax Court also analyzed the issue without
the application of collateral estoppel and dealt with
the taxpayer’s position that by leaving the blank
spaces in the gift documents, the gifts themselves
were necessarily incomplete under section 2038.
Although the donor and donees did not know the
precise number of transferred LLC units on Decem-
ber 27, 2001, and January 4, 2002, because they had
not received the valuation report by those dates, the
parties had agreed to the transfers’ completion. The
court stated that ‘‘the parties’ intent with respect to
the blanks was to have [the decedent’s attorneys]
carry out the terms of the original agreement, not to
grant decedent the right to alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate it.’’ When the appraisal indicated a higher
LLC unit value, the donees agreed to accept that
liability in order to allow the donor to avoid paying
gift tax for the 2002 gift. Despite that, the court held
that ‘‘the modification and other (nonsubstantive)
modifications to the 2001 and 2002 gift documents
carried out the parties’ original agreement; they did
not alter or amend it.’’
Consequently, the Tax Court held that it did not
have to redetermine the estate’s tax liability; how-
ever, because the gifts were made within three years
of the decedent’s death, section 2035(b) would
require the estate tax inclusion of any gift tax paid
on those gifts if the court later determined that the
decedent had undervalued them. Likewise, section
2001(b)(1)(B) would require an increase in the de-
cedent’s adjusted taxable gifts in the decedent’s
estate tax computations. Thus, the court rejected as
premature the estate’s motion for a redetermination
of its estate tax liability.17
The court considered the estate’s motion to find
that New Jersey’s apportionment statute required
the decedent’s nieces to pay all the estate taxes
stemming from the gifts and that the estate’s mari-
tal deduction should therefore not be decreased.
Both the government and the nieces, as intervenors,
argued that such a decision was untimely because
the substantive issues of LLC unit valuation had not
yet been decided. The Tax Court said that New
Jersey’s apportionment provision was like most
states’ in that it required the recipients of property
included in the estate to pay their ratable share of
the estate tax liability. The applicability of the New
Jersey apportionment statute, the court said, must
precede any determination of the amount for which
the beneficiary must reimburse the estate. However,
the court held that since it had found there was no
gift inclusion, no amount would be apportioned to
the nieces.
Finally, the court denied, as premature, the es-
tate’s motion for a decision on the question of
apportionment regarding any section 2035(b) or
2001(b)(1)(B) additional estate taxes.
Analysis and Conclusion
Two aspects of Sommers interest me. The first is
that the parties appear to be arguing their oppo-
nent’s conventional position. The second is that the
court grappled with whether the blanks left in the
gift documents were immaterial to gift completion
for gift tax purposes; however, the court did not
address whether the decedent’s completed gifts
qualified for the annual exclusions as he had
claimed.
The executrix argued that the decedent’s gifts to
his nieces were includable in his estate. The govern-
ment contended that because the decedent did not
retain a taxable ‘‘string,’’ his gifts were complete. At
first blush, those postures seem reversed. But, as the
court explained, if the gifts were included in the
estate, New Jersey’s equitable apportionment stat-
ute would require that additional taxes relating to
the earlier gifts be paid by the nieces as beneficiaries
of the LLC units instead of being taxed to the
decedent’s surviving spouse who was also the sole
beneficiary and executrix of his estate. Alterna-
tively, if the gifts were complete, but undervalued at
that time, any 2001 gift tax deficiency would likely
be payable from his estate, thus reducing the execu-
trix’s (the surviving spouse’s) inheritance.
13Sommers, T.C. Memo. 2013-8, at 28.
14Id. at 29.
15Reg. section 25.2511-2.
16Sommers, T.C. Memo. 2013-8, at 34. 17Id. at 47-48.
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The gift documents omitted the number of LLC
units the decedent intended to transfer to his nieces.
The Tax Court decided that the unfinished part of
the document did not render the gift incomplete
because the decedent had specifically authorized an
agent, his attorney, to fill out those blanks with
number values consistent with the decedent’s intent
to avoid gift tax.18 So, under Indiana law, the
arbitrator’s upholding the validity of the gifts basi-
cally meant that ‘‘the gifts were irrevocable and
absolute,’’ which the Tax Court extended to consti-
tute a finding that the gift tax regulations19 requir-
ing the donor’s transfer of dominion and control
were satisfied.
Further, the New Jersey court found that the
decedent’s gifts transferred in 2001 and 2002 were
valid and irrevocable, saying that a donor who has
a clear donative intent and who entirely relin-
quishes ownership of his property has made a
completed transfer under the gift tax regulations
and cannot have retained section 2038 powers.
Thus, the Tax Court applied issue preclusion to
hold that the decedent’s omission, coupled with a
direction for the attorney to complete the document
using the appraisal values with unit amounts, was
consistent with the decedent’s intention to transfer
all the artwork equally to his three nieces without
his having to pay any gift taxes.
In ruling that the gifts were complete under the
gift tax regulations, however, the court also implic-
itly ruled that the value of the decedent’s unstated
number of LLC shares were ascertainable at the
time of his gifts and that they thus qualified for
annual exclusions. Although in keeping with the
Court’s defined value decisions in such cases as
Wandry20 and Petter,21 the court did not provide an
explicit explanation of how blank spaces in a gift
document at the time of a completed gift can qualify
for the annual exclusion. That is, when the number
of shares is intentionally left blank in the gift
documents, how can possession or enjoyment of the
unstated number of LLC shares be obtained by any
donee immediately upon the making of each Som-
mers gift?
18The court noted that the arbitrator commented that the
decedent did not revoke the estate planning law firm’s authority
to complete the blanks.
19Reg. section 25.2511-2.
20Wandry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-88.
21Estate of Petter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-280, aff’d,
653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). See Gerzog, ‘‘Not All Defined Value
Clauses Are Equal,’’ 10 Pitt. Tax Rev. (forthcoming, article
copyright 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pape
rs.cfm?abstract_id=2106008.
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